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quently done and furnished by a sub-contractor in order to secure the com-
pletion of a building where the principal contractor had failed to carry
on the work. The court held the promise to be an original one and not
within the statute of frauds.
With this mass of conflicting authority to review, the court in Lowe v.
Turpie, 147 Ind. 652, 44 N. E. 25, 47 N. E. 150, 37 L. R. A. 233, upon which
the court in the principal case relies, said "The general rule is that the new
promise must put an end to the original debt, and extinguish it, or other-
wise the new promise will be regarded as collateral, and within the statute."
The rule that there must be an extinguishment of the original debt does not
apply where the primary purpose is to secure benefit to the promisor, in
consideration of which the promisor undertakes to pay the debt of another.
Small v. Schaefer, 24 Md. 143; Weisel v. Spence, 59 Wis. 301, 18 N. W. 165;
Sext v. Geise, 80 Ga. 698, 6 S. E. 174; Craft v. Kendrick, 39 Fla. 90, 21 So.
803; Hall v. Alford, 105 Ky. 664, 49 S. W. 444, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1482; Pool
v. Sanford, 52 Tex. 621; Yeoman v. Mueller, 33 Mo. App. 343; Clifford v.
Luhring, 69 Ill. 401; Schultz v. Cohen, 13 Misc. 638, 34 N. Y. Supp. 927,
69 N. Y. St. Rep. 151; Pizzi v. Nardello, 209 Pa. 1, 57 Atl. 1100; Roy v. Flin,
10 Ariz. 80; McLaughlin v. Austin, 104 Mich. 489, 62 N. W. 719; Fitzgerald
v. Morrissey, 14 Neb. 198, 15 N. W. 233; MeKeenan v. Thissel, 33 Me. 368;
Prout v. Webb, 87 Ala. 593, 6 So. 190; Wickham v. Hyde Park Building and
Loan Ass'n, 80 Ill. App. 523; Berg v. Spitz, 87 App. Div. 602, 84 N. Y.
Supp. 532. In some jurisdictions, however, interest alone, or a desire to
,btain a benefit to himself, is not sufficient to sustain a promise to answer
for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, but there must be an
entire novation, a substitution of the promisor in the place and stead of the
original debtor, and his release. Several cases in Massachusetts, Vermont,
and Virginia have followed the doctrine that a release of the original debtor
is necessary before the promise can be outside the statute. Griffin v. Cun-
ningham, 183 Mass. 505, 67 N. E. 660; Miles v. Driscoll, 201 Mass. 318, 87
N. E. 579; Engleby v. Harvey, 93 Va. 440, 25 S. E. 225; Newell v. Ingraham,
15 Vt. 422; Anderson v. Davis, 9 Vt. 136, 31 Am. Dec. 612; Sinclair v.
Richardson, 12 Vt. 33; and Garfield v. Rutland Ins. Co., 69 Vt. 549, 38
Atl. 235.
If it can be said in the principal case that the primary purpose of the
promisor was to gain some advantage to himself, and not to aid the debtor,
and if the principal case and Lowe v. Turpie, supra, are to be the law in
Indiana, it seems that Indiana has adopted the minority rule with regard
to verbal contracts of guaranty, and a rule which will tend to extend, rather
than diminish, the application of this section of the statute of frauds.
0. M. B.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF ORAL CONTRACT TO CON-
vnY LAND--PART PERFORMANCE--In 1920 the decedent proposed to his
daughter, the plaintiff, that if she and her husband would dispose of their
home in Indianapolis, and if her husband would relinquish his employment
there; and if the family would move to Jasper county, Indiana, and build
a home and make improvements on the south forty acres of the home place
of the decedent, he would, by his will, devise to the plaintiff the said forty
acres. Relying upon this offer the plaintiff and her husband sold and dis-
posed of their home in Indianapolis, removed to Jasper county and con-
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structed on said south forty acres permanent and lasting improvements,
consisting of a dwelling house, summer kitchen, barn, corncrib, and other
improvements of the value of $2,500, with the knowledge and approval of
the decedent who with his wife, the defendant, lived on the home place
within 170 rods of the improvements. The plaintiff and her family have
ever since resided in the dwelling house. All of the improvements were
made on the S. 10 acres of the N. 13% acres of the W. %/ of the S. E. %
of section 18 in the year 1921 or 1922, and in 1923 the plaintiff and her
husband built a fence along the north side of said 10 acres inclosing the
same and separating it from the lands occupied by the decedent and the
defendant. The plaintiff has never been in possession of more than the
said 10 acres. The decedent devised to the plaintiff the said 13k acres
which included the 10 acres of which the plaintiff was in possession, and to
the defendant he devised the 26% acres which constituted the remaining
portion of the 40 acres covered by the parol agreement. The plaintiff seeks
to be adjudged the owner of this 26% acres and prays that a commissioner
be appointed to convey the record title to her. The trial court found that
the plaintiff was entitled to have specific performance of the parol contract
and the defendant appeals. Held, judgment reversed, and the cause re-
manded with instructions to restate the conclusions of law in favor of the
defendant and to enter judgment accordingly. The specific enforcement of
an oral contract for the conveyance of real estate, within the Statute of
Frauds, cannot be had in the absence of possession taken by the purchaser
under and pursuant to the contract, even though there has been complete
compliance with the terms of the contract on the part of the persons to
whom the land was to be conveyed. Donnelly v. Fletemeyer, Appellate Court
of Indiana, July 1, 1931, 176 N. E. 868.
Apparently, under this decision, possession must be taken by the grantee
under an oral contract to convey land, of the entire premises contracted to
be conveyed in order to take the contract out of the operation of the Statute
of Frauds, or the doctrine of part performance can not be invoked. Had
the decedent disinherited the plaintiff altogether could she have enforced
a conveyance of the ten acres which she and her husband had occupied and
improved? The logical consequence of the decision in the principal case is
that she could not. Obviously, a part of such an indivisible contract could
not be so taken out of the operation of the statute (which theoretically
reaches no farther than to deny the right of action to enforce such an agree-
ment) and the rest of the contract left within the operation of the statute.
But why should the partial taking of possession in pursuance of the con-
tract not be a sufficient part performance? This point seems to have re-
ceived little or no consideration from the courts. It has been held in sev-
eral states that where there is an entire contract for the sale of distinct
parcels to the vendee for a gross price, his possession of one of the parcels
is deemed to be a possession of all. In the case of Smith v. Underdunck,
1 Sandf. Ch. 579 (N. Y., 1884), the court said, "I find no authority which
requires the buyer to take possession of all the lands sold, in order to make
such a part performance as will establish a parol agreement for their sale.
The reason assigned for giving this effect to the act of taking possession,
is as applicable to entering into a part of the land sold, as it is to an entry
into the possession of the whole." And see Bryson v. McShane, 48 W. Va.
126; Bertz v. Paff, 95 Wis. 95; Browne on The Statute of Frauds, Sec. 475.
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It is said by Professor Story that, "A verbal agreement for the sale of
lands or an interest therein may be enforced in either of two cases: first,
when that agreement has been partly performed; and secondly, when to
declare the agreement invalid would work a fraud upon the plaintiff."
2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence 78. It is submitted that the principal case
might well be regarded to be either one, or both, of these two cases. The
plaintiff has performed her part of the contract and the consideration given
by her can not be adequately measured in terms of money. It is arguable
that the decedent was, after the performance by the plaintiff, a trustee of
the 40 acres for the plaintiff and that she was entitled to it in equity. Does
not the decedent's failure to convey or devise the land to the plaintiff work
a fraud upon her? And since the plaintiff has paid the consideration
(either on the bargain theory or on the theory of promissory estoppel) for
the promise and in addition has taken possession of a part of the premises,
it is submitted that there has been such part performance as to take the
contract out of the operation of the statute. The court has assumed with-
out deciding, and apparently without noticing, the proposition that posses-
sion of a part of the premises is not such a possession as is required to
constitute part performance. Such an assumption seems unwarranted in
view of the fact that this point has never been decided, in this state at
least., The proposition seems dubious on principle and has been so declared
by the text writers and the majority of the few cases in which it has been
considered.
There are a variety of views on the doctrine of part performance and as
many, or more, theories in support of them. Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Tennessee have repudiated the doctrine altogether. In some
states, including Indiana, the fair value of services rendered or benefits
conferred upon the vendor by the vendee in pursuance of the contract may
be recovered in quasi contract, while in other states such a recovery is
denied. St. Joseph, etc., Co. v. Globe, etc., Co., 156 Ind. 665. In most juris-
dictions the payment of the purchase money, in full or in part, is not a
sufficient act of performance to take the contract out of the operation of
the statute, but a contrary rule prevails in Delaware by an early decision
and in Iowa by statute, while in Georgia some of the cases recognize pay-
ment as sufficient although at least one of the earlier cases does not. In
England, Indiana, and many of the states possession taken in pursuance of
the contract is sufficient part performance. (Brown on The Statute of
Frauds, sec. 467; Peterbaugh v. Peterbaugh, 131 Ind. 289) while other
states require in addition to possession either full or part payment of the
purchase price or improvements made upon the property by the vendee.
While the doctrine of part performance applies to oral gifts of land, or
promises to give land, it is generally required in such cases, to authorize
specific enforcement, that both possession is taken and improvements are
made by the donee. Brown on The Statute of Frauds, see. 467; Swales V.
Jackson, 126 Ind. 282. S. J. S.
TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRErIES--MAINTENANCB AND SuppoRT-Appellee
brought an action against appellant in the Clay Circuit Court for support;
obtained service on the appellant by publication; the Court rendered judg-
ment, making an allowance to appellee "in the nature of alimony" in the
sum of $2,000, and ordered land held by the husband and wife as tenants by
